Return of refugees and the future of Kosova

18/06/2002 - Trepça.net

Return of refugees and the future of Kosova

Tuesday, June 18, 2002

By Rogelj Peter

The international community (IC) is exerting pressure on Albanians to adopt co-operative stance with regard to return of displaced persons (DP), primarily Serbs. It seems that Albanians are in quandary: on the one hand they cannot ignore demands of IC; while on the other hand they see a danger in the return of Serbs for independence of Kosova. The underlying reason for this kind of reasoning lies in conviction that less Serbs in Kosova mean greater chance for independence and vice versa.

This kind of reasoning is wrong. In fact, Albanians should adopt a completely different course: they should promote returns spearheading the whole process with the assistance of the internationals. Far from posing a danger for independent Kosova, the process of return is a pre-condition for realisation of Albanian interests. By obstructing the process of return, Albanians would play into hands of Serbs jeopardising their strategic goals. It can be said without exaggeration: the process of return and integration of minorities should be placed in the first place in order of importance for achieving Albanian goals, before economy, education etc.


The word “return” from the legal point

The meaning of the word “return” can be subject to manipulations, therefore it needs to be explained. Return is connected more with (residential) property than with people. As a result of conflict, some people have been forced to abandon their residential property (homes). These people are called displaced people or refugees. However, according to international law and human rights norms by abandoning their property these people have not lost title to this property. They are still rightful owners of the property they have abandoned, however they cannot enjoy their right to dispose of their property. Their property can be damaged, destroyed or used by other people who don’t possess title deeds thus being illegal users of this property.

The word “return” means restitution of residential property (residences and pertaining land) to their legal owners. Therefore, “return” does not mean necessarily permanent physical return of displaced persons to their property. Displaced person can alienate this property by sale or exchange for some other property, it’s not necessary to use it. Of course, the authorities are obliged to create proper conditions for all people under their jurisdiction to enjoy their property. With regard to residential property, enjoying property means that people have right to live in their residences in safety and dignity.

Therefore, no honest man can be, in principle, against the return (of abandoned property). The right to dispose of one’s property is one of the fundamental human rights and in fact, the whole theory of human rights have been developed in western civilisation from the need for protection of private property. From the moral and legal point of view, denying the right of return to displaced persons means being in favour of theft. From political point of view, those who oppose return of Serbs are collaborators of Belgrade’s plan for partition of Kosova.

Therefore, there should be no dilemma whether Albanian leadership and people should be in favour of return or not. The Kosova’s government set itself as a goal creating a society based along the lines of Western societies. And in the West, the right to private property is undisputable. Therefore, it’s an obligation of Kosova’s government and institutions to give full support the process of return of private residential property to their legal owners, regardless of their ethnic origin, as well as creation of conditions (tolerance, reconciliation, coexistence) that owners can enjoy their property in peace (i.e. to live in their original homes).


Colonisation as opposed to return from the legal point

It’s well known that Belgrade tries to abuse return for the new colonisation of Kosova. Instead of return to their property (i.e. original homes), Belgrade plans to settle displaced people elsewhere in 24 “groups of settlements” (the plan is available at http://www.serbia.sr.gov.yu/coordination_centre/index.html). Like return to one’s home is a basic human right, equally colonisation is a sheer racism and blatant example of discrimination and violation of human rights. From the moral and legal point of view, colonisation is unacceptable since it means distribution free of charge of public property (land or money) only to particular group of people. However, public property must be accessible to all people on equal terms. Giving public property free of charge to some persons, only because of their ethnic origin means racism and violation of human rights of other people being excluded from free distribution of resources in public property. If public-owned resources are to be transferred to private property free of charge (which is illogical from economic point of view) this must be done without discrimination on ethnic and any other grounds.

Belgrade can perform its anti-Albanian plan of colonisation only by free of charge privatisation of public-owned Kosova’s land to Serbs (thus discriminating non-Serbs) or/and by using public money of all taxpayers (including Albanians from Presheva Valley) for buying private land and construction of homes for Serb colonists (“returnees”). Public money can be used only for reconstruction of damaged homes or new constructions where homes are destroyed but only on land owned by owner of destroyed home.

Belgrade justifies its policy of colonisation on the grounds that there is no safety for Serbs in Albanian-majority settlements, therefore new ethnic pure Serb settlements have to be constructed. This justification cannot be valid. Serbs fearing to return to their homes can freely sell their properties once they repossess them. With this money they can buy land in other part of Kosova when they feel secure. It is not that Serbs may not live in ethnic homogenous settlements. Giving land free of charge or building homes with taxpayers’ money for particular ethnic group is something unacceptable and unfair to other groups. It is understandable why is Belgrade against such voluntary migrations. Because it is highly unlikely that Kosova’s Serb after having sold their property will buy some property in other part of Kosova. It’s almost for certain that he will realise purchase in Serbia.

In sum, the word “return” means repossession of abandoned private property by rightful owner. It is a realisation of human right to use and dispose of one’s property. On the other hand, “colonisation” means free of charge and discriminatory transfer of public property to private property to particular group of people. It is a discrimination in favour of people receiving public property and discrimination against people being excluded from the distribution scheme. And Albanians should make clear that like they are going to be in favour of return, they would equally inexorably fight colonisation.
The overall process of return should be based on the following principles:

Displaced persons whose (real) property is occupied by other persons (squatters) should be reinstated to their property, while squatters should be evicted.
Destroyed houses can be re-constructed only on land owned by displaced persons.
Where land owned by displaced persons is already covered by the new buildings, the municipal authorities are obliged to supply free of charge displaced persons with the land of equal size from public-owned land holdings in the same settlement or to offer them some other form of fair compensation.

In this regard, Albanians should prevent intention of Belgrade (presented in the afore-mentined plan) to construct 93 houses in Osojan village. These houses will be apparently built for Serbs who never lived there. The easiest way to prevent colonisation is to deny connection to electric network for every building having been constructed without building permit


RETURN OF REFUGEES AS A PRE-CONDITION FOR REALISATION OF STRATEGIC ALBANIAN GOALS IN THE REGION

Impact of return on the final status of Kosova

There are three possible solutions of Kosova’s status:

Independent Kosova
Non-independent Kosova
Independence for one part of Kosova and Belgrade’s rule for another part (partition)

Albanians are too much preoccupied with the independence that they are overlooking the fact that independent Kosova does not mean necessarily Kosova in existing borders. It is very possible that Kosova will be independent but on the reduced territory, which, of course, is not in Albanian interest.

In fact, it’s not secret that Belgrade itself has already realised that there are meagre chances to rule the whole Kosova again. The proposals of Belgrade for colonisation can be viewed as a preparing ground for partition of Kosova. Many Serbian leaders are privately advocating partition as a way for solution of Kosova’s conflict. That, of course, mean that these Serbs are not against independence of Kosova in itself – they are against independent Kosova in existing borders but they would not oppose to independent Kosova in reduced territory. That doesn’t mean that Serb threat is over. According to some published maps (like the one of the leading Serb strategist for Kosova’s issues Bratislava Krstic which is outlined at http://www.cdsp.neu.edu/info/students/marko/vreme/vreme96.html), Serbs will be satisfied with at least of 30% of Kosova’s territory, including Albanian-majority areas. They want to carry out population transfer by expelling Albanians from this part of Kosova and settling Serbs from all parts of Kosova there. This would resemble the situation in Cyprus, where Turks as minority had claimed partition and Turkey finally made this a reality in 1974 by occupying 37% of the island, although Turks accounted for only 18% of population.

That means that the battle for independent Kosova has probably won while the question of Kosova’s borders is still open. It can be predicted with great likelihood that this will be an issue in the future international conference on the Kosova’s status: the border of the new state of Kosova – will these borders be the same as the current borders or they will be changed and if so, how they will look like.

The idea for partition of Kosova could sound attractive for international diplomats since it smacks of compromise between competing Albanian and Serb goals. Albanians would get independent state of Kosova, however they would have to concede on territorial reduction. Serbs would have to accept independent Kosova, however they would be appeased by retaining a part of Kosova. The partition of Kosova would be easily effected since it already exists on the ground – it only needs to be formalised.

Albanians must be aware that it will be much harder to defend integrity of Kosova than to achieve independence of Kosova. IC has not particular obligations to protect integrity of Kosova since by giving it independence it would also not protected integrity of Serbia/Yugoslavia. Therefore, in the next period the main assignment for Albanians will be to defend territorial integrity of Kosova, not to achieve independence. And they will have to put a lot of effort to achieve that goal.

Winning international support for integrity of Kosova is of crucial importance for the liberation of Albanians in Eastern Kosova, return of Albanians in their homes in northern Mitrovica and prevention of displacement of those Albanians living on the territories ceded to Serbia in the event of further reduction of Kosova’s territory. At least, partition would confirm the present status quo – Serbia would retain northern Kosova and perhaps some territories in the east of Kosova (around Ranllug).

They are wrong those Albanians thinking that IC will give them Eastern Kosova as a compensation for northern Kosova. 1244 Resolution refers only to Kosova and international decision will be made only for the territory of Kosova. Presheva valley is outside of the international decision-making process, it is regarded as internal affair of Serbia. Possible exchange of Eastern Kosova for northern Kosova will result as a part of deal between Kosova and Serbia and it will be not imposed by the internationals. The pre-condition for conclusion of such a deal is securing (territorial) integrity of Kosova. Only by winning international support for independent Kosova in the present borders, Serbia will be forced to give up Presheva valley (a part of it which is situated east of the main A-10 highway and railroad) if they want to retain northern Kosova. Otherwise, Serbia will certainly try to retain northern Kosova without giving Eastern Kosova.

If IC will not impose territorial swap between northern Kosova and Eastern Kosova, how then territorial integrity of Kosova will be secured? The answer lies in the Steiner’s formula – mutual dependence of integration (i.e. integrity of Kosova) and multiethnicity (i.e. respect of minority (Serb) rights). Mr Steiner said lately that partition is not an option – however, he immediately said that Kosova would be multiethnic. The battle for integrity of Kosova (as a pre-condition for the freedom for still enslaved Albanians in Eastern Kosova) will be won or lost at the field of respect of minority (especially Serbs’) rights. Failure of Albanians to uphold rights of minorities will have besides territorial reduction of Kosova and continuation of enslavement of Albanians in Eastern Kosova also other negative long-term consequences for Albanians: difficulties in accessing European integrations and negative impact for the rights of Albanians in Macedonia.

In this regard, it can be said that return of Serbs does not endanger independence of Kosova but on the contrary it is a condition for integrity of Kosova and realisation of other Albanian designs in the region. For this reason, Albanians must wholeheartedly support return and integration of all displaced persons. The programme of the Kosova’s government listed eight points – integration of minorities in Kosova’s society (without mentioning the return of displaced persons!) was the last one. In fact, it should have been on the first place. Not for the sake of minorities, but for the sake of Albanians. All other points of the Government’s programme are on a more or less direct way conditional on this point. Namely, IC will have the last say on the fate of Kosova – and the internationals have made clear that the future status of Kosova (whether being the whole or partitioned) will depend on respect of rights of minorities by Albanians. And the way the status of Kosova will be resolved will have profound impact on the position of all Albanians in the region, not only Kosovars.


The political connection between the process of return and integrity of Kosova

NATO intervened in Kosova in 1999 to protect human rights (of Albanian people) in Kosova. By this intervention and placing Kosova under international protectorate the West made clear that human rights are more important than territorial integrity, in this case the integrity of Serbia/Yugoslavia.

The same principle stands also for Kosova. It is not possible to claim integrity of Kosova and to treat various communities in Kosova in a different way. Equal treatment of all Kosovar citizens by Albanian-dominated Kosova’s institutions is a pre-condition for claiming territorial integrity of Kosova. By behaving as if Kosova belongs only to Albanians, Albanians will get a partitioned, reduced and internationally isolated Kosova.

From the legal point of view it’s untenable to claim integrity of Kosova while denying Serbs (and other minorities, like Roma) equal rights as Albanians. If Serbs will not be able to enjoy all their rights (and the right to repossess and freely use abandoned private property is a very important human right) on Albanian-dominated territory, a separate territory for them will be created in a part of Kosova where Serbs will be able to enjoy their rights. That means partition of Kosova.

This is obvious in the case of Mitrovica. Last week, one NATO diplomat said about Mitrovica: “If Albanians are serious in striving for united Mitrovica, they will have to enable the return of Serbs. By accepting Serb returnees in their midst, Albanians will prove that unification of Mitrovica is not a code for expulsion of Serbs from northern Mitrovica. And no-one will accept unification of Mitrovica if it leads to expulsion of Serbs.” Last year, former NATO Commander General Wesley Clark said about Mitrovica: “The way to claim Mitrovica is to demonstrate hospitality to the Serbs, and that's the hard truth. I know that's a hard truth. I know there are things that are wrong there but that's what has to be done.” Albanians can denounce IC for tolerating parallel structures in northern Kosova.

However, they haven’t done their part of obligations (respect of human rights of Serbs) in order that IC can engage seriously to dismantle these parallel structures. Indeed, the situation in Mitrovica is in contravention of 1244 Resolution and Constitutional Framework, which foresee united Kosova and international officials are breaking both documents by tolerating division of Kosova. However, the Constitutional Framework also provides for that “Kosova’s institutions have to take all necessary measures to enable safe return of refugees and displaced persons to Kosova and to fully co-operate with UNHCR and other international and non-governmental organisations in relation to return of refugees and displaced persons”.

Albanians will easier demand from the internationals to fulfil their obligations regarding securing integrity of Kosova, when Kosova’s institutions (central and local) deliver their part of responsibilities regarding the return of refugees and displaced persons. And it’s for sure that Mitrovica will stay divided as long as there is no fundamental change in Albanian attitude towards the return of Serbs.


Demographic connection between the process return and integrity of Kosova

There are concerns in Kosova that return of Serbs will lead to creation of new enclaves thus threatening integrity of Kosova. These fears are mostly unfounded. Parallel structures can be established only in Serb-majority settlements. These parallel structures can imperil territorial integrity of Kosova on the long term only in Serb-majority settlements where there is no barrier in the form of geography or (better) Albanian settlement between them and states hostile to Kosova, especially Serbia. However, an overwhelming majority (93.500 out of about 100.000) displaced Serbs come from Albanian-majority settlements, especially towns. And return of these Serbs, can in no way pose a threat to Kosova’s integrity.

Here are the villages, where repossession of property would re-establish Serb majority considering that 30% of displaced persons currently living in collective centres in Serbia have expressed they don’t want to return according to the survey made this year by Coordination Centre for Kosovo-Metohija (CCK).

Table 1: Kosova’s settlements with at least 58% of Serbs before the war, now emptied by them

In total, there are 24 villages where repossession of property would (maybe) re-establish Serb local majority (in addition there are 6 mixed villages where Serb local majority was under 58%). These villages numbered about 5.000 Serbs and they are scattered on nine locations (seven groups and two individual villages). Two of these groups are not completely surrounded by Albanian settlements, however they are separated by high impassable mountain ranges from Montenegro (villages around Brestovik) and Macedonia (villages around Sredske). It’s obvious from the above table that return of displaced Serbs doesn’t present a threat to integrity of Kosova.

The opposite is true. The return of displaced Serbs would contribute to integrity of Kosova and strengthen Albanian position. The main Serb argument for partition of Kosova is that Serbs cannot live in a territory under Albanian rule thus being entitled to their own territory. Looking from this point of view, every Serb living among Albanians refutes this claim. More Serbs live in Albanian-majority areas, the weaker is argument for territorial separation and partition of Kosova. For this reason, it is in Albanian interest that substantial numbers of Serbs live in Albanian-majority areas to refute Serb claims that separation is necessary for existence of Serbs in Kosova. Since there are currently too few Serbs in Albanian-majority settlements it is in Albanian interest that the numbers of Serbs in their midst increase through the process of return.


RETURN AND DEMOGRAPHICS OF KOSOVA

Impact of return of Serbs on ethnic geography of Kosova

From the viewpoint of preserving territorial integrity of Kosova it would be the most favourable geographic disposition if Serbs were evenly arranged in the the whole Kosova, that is if proportion of Serbs in every settlement would reflect average Kosova-wide proportion of 11%. Concentration of Serbs is not in Albanian interest. However, if concentration takes place it would be the best if all points of Serb concentration were surrounded by Albanian-majority settlements thus being separated from the main Serb areas. And it’s better to have concentration in towns than in villages, since having majority in villages is more important in terms of control of land in some country.

The real situation is different from this ideal one. And there were major changes in ethnic geography after the conflict. Here is the disposition of Serbs in settlements in Kosova before and after the war.

Table 2: Change of ethnic profile of Kosova’s settlements